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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COM-
PANY, a Delaware corporation, an<l 
DESERET INVESTORS 
GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
BEA VER COUNTY, a legislative 
corporation of the State of Utah, HY-
RUM L. LEE, EUGENE H. 
l\IA YER, HOVV j_\HD .T. PRYOR, 
coustituting the Hoard of Commission-
ers of Be~wer County, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
11318 
APPELLANTS' STATEMENT 
OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 11318 was consolidated for trial with 
Case No. 11317 and is an action brought by Phillips 
Petroleum Company and Deseret Investors Group, Inc., 
1 
attacking ( 1) a zoning resolution adopted by Beaver 
County, and ( 2) the validity of the resolution as ap-
plied to the Plaintiffs' property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The trial court ( C. Nelson Day) held in a memor-
andum decision that ( 1) the zoning resolution of Bea-
ver County is valid and is valid as applied to the Plain-
tiffs' properties, ( 2) the Board of County Commis-
sioners of Beaver County did not act unreasonably in 
denying the Plaintiffs' petition to amend the ordinance 
and reclassify Plaintiffs' properties, and ( 3) that the 
Defendants are entitled to judgment of no cause of 
action. 
From this decision, the Plaintiffs have appealed, 
as has Chevron Oil Company in the companion case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Phillips Petroleum Company and Deseret Inves-
tors Group, Inc., seek on this appeal to have this Court 
reverse the trial court, and determine that the zoning 
resolution adopted by Beaver County is ( 1) invalid on 
its face, and ( 2) is invalid as applied to the Plaintiffs' 
properties. 
2 
lDBNTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND 
EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Phillips Petroleum Company, a Delaware Corpo-
ration and Deseret Investors Group, Inc., a Utah Cor-
poration, were Plaintiffs below in Case No. 11318 and 
are Appellants on this Appeal and will hereafter he 
referred to as "Phillips" and "Deseret Investors," re-
spectively, or simply as "Plaintiffs." 
The Defendants below will be referred to as "Bea-
Yer County," or as "Defendants." 
The Plaintiff in the companion case, No. 11317, 
CheYro11 Oil Company, doing business as Standard Oil 
Company of California, shall be referred to as "CheY-
" ron. 
The abbreviations used in this Brief, referring to 
parts of the Record, are: ( H) , the hearing before the 
Beaver County Commission; ( R) , Record of the case ; 
(F), File of Case and (D), as the deposition of Dr. 
::Hilton Matthews, which was accepted as part of the 
record of the case, by stiuplation of the parties, subject 
to certain objections of the Defendants, which were 
Oi'erruled by the Court ( R-17 5-6) . 
S'l'A'l'E:l\1ENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs in this case join in the Statement of 
Facts set out in the Brief of Plaintiff, Chevron, and add 
the following particulars: 
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90% of Beaver County is gTazing area and, of this, 
the forest area is best suited for grazing ( R-337) ; as a 
matter of fact, the greater portion of the County can be 
classified as desert, except for approximately 200 farm~ 
scattered throughout the County and three towns: Bea. 
ver (population 1,653); Milford (population 1,556) anJ 
Minersville ( population 550) ( .F) -336-7, Pre-trial 
Order). 
On August 2, 1947, under the provisions of the 
Federal Highway Act of 1944, the Commissioner of 
Public Roads designated the control points for Inter· 
state 15 in Utah, i.e. the points through which I-15 
would run in the State of Utah (Exhibit 18). 
On November 7, 1958, a public hearing was held 
in Beaver City, with respect to the exact location of the 
Freeway through Beaver County and on August 3. 
1959, the Utah State Road Commission approved the 
definite and final location of the route of I-15 through 
Beaver County (Exhibit 18). 
On or about November 26, 1958, the County Com· 
mission hired Mr. I. Dale Despain to prepare a zoning 
ordinance for Beaver County (R-263) and on May 18, 
1959, a Resolution of Zoning was passed by the Bearer 
County Commissioners (Exhibit 1) . 
On December 6, 1965, a hearing was held before 
the Beaver County Commission on Plaintiffs' and 
Chevron's Petition for Change of Zoning from "Graz· 
ing" to "Highway Service Zone" which Petition was 
denied. 
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At the time of the trial, approximately 20 miles of 
the Freeway had been completed, beginning at the Hea-
ver County line on the North and extending South to 
Beaver City, where construction ended (Exhibits H, 
15 and 16), but after completion of the Freeway, the 
City of Heaver will be bypassed. Interstate 70, which 
is an East-\,Y est arm of the Interstate System, begins 
in \V ashington, D.C., and passes through Kansas City, 
St. Louis and Denver and ends when it connects onto 
l-15, at the Cove Fort Interchange, located in Millard 
County, approximately three miles North of Pine Creek 
Interchange ( H-28). There are only one or two other 
places in the entire Interstate System, where a Freeway 
dead-ends into another Freeway, as is the intersection 
of 1-70 with I-15 at Cove Fort Interchange and this is 
of great significance because of the traffic pattern set 
up by the joinder of the two Freeway Systems and the 
greatly increased traffic flow. It is anticipated that the 
greater part of the traffic from I-70 will head Soufa 
toward California, rather than North toward Salt Lake 
City ( H-28). I-15 through Beaver County is expected 
lo be completed by December 31, 1970 and I-70 is ex-
pected to be completed by December, 1972 (Exhibit 
22). 
The construction of the Freeway represents the 
single, most important event in the history of Beaver 
County in the last 20 years ( H-28) . 
The Pine Creek Interchange with which this law-
suit is concerned, is the first interchange on I-15, lo-
5 
cated a few miles South of the North Beaver Counlr 
line. The average daily traffic flow along I-15, 011 th.e 
completed leg of the Freeway between Beaver City au<l 
Pine Creek Interchange, is 2,685 vehicles ( approxi-
mately one-half in each direction) and it is estimated 
that this represents a total of approximately 7,500 per-
sons using the Freeway each day. Two times as many 
people use the Freeway each day as the present popula-
tion of Beaver County. It is estimated by studies con-
ducted by the State Road Commission that the average 
daily traffic in 1975 will be 5,800 vehicles or an average 
of 15,000 persons using the Freeway each day (Exhibit 
20), (R-120-1). 
Millard County, on the North, has no County Zon-
ing Ordinance and Iron County, on the South, has a 
Zoning Ordinance almost identical to the Resolution 
adopted by Beaver County. In fact, the Resolution 
used in Beaver County was copied from the Resolution 
in Iron County ( R-378-9) but Iron County has zoned 
all of their interchanges as "highway service" (Exhibit 
3), (H-10-12). 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. THE ZONING RESOLUTION 
OF BEAVER COUNTY CONFISCATES 
THE PLAINTIFFS' PROPER TY BY PRE-
VENTING ANY ECONOMIC USE THERE-
OF AND VIOLATES BOTH THE STATE 
AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. -··········· 
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POINT II. THE ZONING ORDINANCE 
IS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE, DIS-
CRIMINATORY AND VOID AS APPLIED 
TO THE PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY. 
A. THE PINE CHEEK INTERCHANGE 
IS THE BEST LOCATION ALONG I-15 
lN BEA VER COUNTY FOR THE ES-
TABLISHMENT OF A HIGH,VAY 
SERVICE ZONE. -----·--·------·---------·----··--------·-·· 
B. THERE IS A PRESENT NEED FOR 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HIGH-
\V AY SERVICE ZONE AT PINE 
CHEEK INTERCHANGE. -----------------------·--
C. THE EFFECT OF THE PRESENT 
ZONING RESOLUTION IS TO REGU-
LATE AND RESTRICT BUSINESS 
AND TO CREATE A MONOPOLY AT 
BEA VER CITY. -------------------------·--------------------
D. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
HIGI-nVAY SERVICE ZONE AT PINE 
CREEK INTERCHANGE "\VILL IN-
CREASE THE TAX BASE OF BEA VER 
COUNTY AND HAVE NO MEASUR-
ABLE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT GP-
ON THE COUNTY OR ANY OF THE 
INCORPORATED CITIES.-----------------·------
POINT III. THE ZONING RESOLU-
TION ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ON MAY 18, 
19.:rn, IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
OX ITS FACE AND EVIDENCES ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE 
BOARD OF COGNTY COMMISSIONERS ... 
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POINT IV. THE ZONING RESOLU-
TION AS ADOPTED BY BEAVER COUN-
TY HAS THE EFFECT OF INTERFER-
ING lVITH AND BEING A BURDEN ON 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE. ----------------------------
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEA-
VER COUNTY CONFISCATES THE PLAHi-
TIFFS' PROPERTY BY PREVENTING AXY 
ECONOMIC USE THEREOF AND YIO-
LATES BOTH THE STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
Mr. Elwood Corry, who was qualified as an Ap-
praiser, testified at the trial that the value of the ground. 
as presently zoned for grazing, was worth $20 to $30 per 
acre, or the total value for the approximately 50 acrei 
owned by the Plaintiffs and Chevron, was approxi-
mately $1,500. If the property were zoned for highway 
service, it was worth approximately $10,000 per acre. 
or a total value for the approximately 50 acres wa1 
$500,000 (R-104-5). Mr. Corry stated .....a that the 
appraisal of the ground zoned for grazing was based 
upon the fact that it would take approximately 70 acre1 
to graze one cow and one cow would have one calf per 
year. 
Substantially the same testimony was given by 
another Appraiser, John Bushnell, at the hearing be· 
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fore the County Commission. He appraised the pro-
verty as zoned for grazing at approximately $50 per 
acre and at $10,000 per acre when zoned for highway 
service ( H-68-9) . 
No greater illustration of extremes could be fouud, 
if you deliberately set out to look for them. Under pre-
sent zoning, the combined acreage of the Plaintiffs an<l 
Chevron cannot even graze one cow for a year and so 
for all intents and purposes, the ground is worthle,,s, 
hut if zoned as highway service, it is valued at $500,00U. 
The law on this point, supporting Plaintiffs' positio1:, 
has been extensively cited in Chevron's well-written briti' 
"ith which we concur. Accordingly, we will not under-
take a lengthy dissertation of the law in this brief. 
\Ve <lo, however, particularly refer the Court to the 
case of Arvene Bay, etc. vs. 1'hatcher, 15 N.E. 2d 587 
(noted in 117 A.L.R. 1117, 1130) which is cited i11 
Chevron's brief at page 10. We also call the Court's 
attention to the case of LaSalle National Bank of Chi-
cago vs. 1'he County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, which in-
\'olved a factual situation very similar to the instant 
case. In that case, the Court stated ( 69-70) : 
"No one factor is controlling. It is not the 
mere loss in value alone that is significant, but 
the fact that the public welfare does not require 
the restriction and resulting loss. 'Vhen it is 
shown that no reasonable basis of public welfare 
requires the limitation or restriction and result-
ing loss, the ordinance fails and the presumption 
of rnlidity is dissipated. The law does not re-
9 
quire that the subject property be totally unsuit-
able for the purpose classified but it is sufficient 
that a substantial decrease in value results trom 
a classification bearing no substantial relation tu 
the public welfare." 
The action of the Beaver County Commission 1, 
flagrantly confiscatory and violates both the State and 
Federal Constitutions. 
POINT II 
THE ZONING ORDINANCE IS ARBI-
TRARY, UNREASONABLE, DISCRIMINA-
TORY AND VOID AS APPLIED TO THE 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY. 
A. THE PINE CREEK INTERCHANGE 
IS THE BEST LOCATION ALONG I-15 
IN BEA VER COUNTY FOR THE ES-
TABLISHMENT OF A HIGHWAY SER-
VICE ZONE. 
The Pine Creek Interchange is the number one spot 
in the county for the establishment of a Highway Ser-
vice Zone (D-35). All of the witnesses concurred with 
this statement. This interchange is located approxi-
matelv 20 miles North of Beaver City, almost to the 
Beav;r County line; it has excellent visibility from botl1 
directions and the diamond shaped interchange focili 
tates easy off and on for highway traffic. 
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Even Mr. I. Dale Despain, who is a consulting 
plauner by occupation, who was called on behalf of tl 1e 
Defendants and the person who wrote the Zoning Heso-
lulion for Heaver County, admitted: 
"Q. N ?W, then is?'t it true, in your opinion, 
that theres no question that along 1-15 in l3ea-
Yer County, as it now exists, that there is 110 
better place for the establishment of highway 
seri;ice facilities, as such, no more logical place 
for the establishment of them than at the Pine 
Creek Interchange? 
"A. That's a logical location if it's to be. lf it 
should be, that's a logical location. 
"Q. If zoning permitted, it would be the ideal 
location I-15, would it not? 
"A. Yes." (R-367) 
.Mr. Ralph Strong, Real Estate Agent, for Phil-
lips Petroleum Company stated: 
"Now, Beaver, you sell a lot of gasoline, a lot 
of petroleum products in this town. Because it 
is a natural stopping place. We're about 200, 
220 miles from Salt Lake City. 'Ve're 250 miles 
from Las Vegas. "'Then the interstate system 
is completed the Pine Creek Interchange will be 
the natural stopping place for these customers, 
so if you gentlemen let facilities in there, yo~1 
will - the facilities will do a tremendous busi-
ness and of course Beaver County will benefit. 
If you do not let facilities in the;e, these inter-
state travelers will trade in the next county 
or in the first county they come to where they 
can have easy off and on to the interstate." (H-
30) 
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Mr. Owen W. Burnham, who is the City Planner 
for Ogden City, Utah, called on behalf of the Plaintiffs 
to testify, stated with respect to this particular location: 
''Q. 'Vhere, in your opinion, is the best place 
in all of lleaver County for the establishment of 
a highway service zope? ... 
"A. Yes. As I have studied this to the extent 
that I have, I believe what has been referred to 
as the Pine Creek Interchange would be the 
mos~ logical and the best location for a highway 
service zone in the county. 
"Q. Does it meet all of the qualifications in 
your best judgment1 I mean, all of the qualifi-
cations as stated in the highway service zone ob· 
jectives on Page 4;3 of the ordinance, does it 
meet those objectives and characteristics of the 
highway service zone? 
"A. Yes , !think it meets it in all respects." 
(R-215-6) 
B. THERE IS A PRESENT NEED FOR 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HIGH-
WAY SERVICE ZONE AT PINE CREEK 
INTERCHANGE. 
The evidence presented at both the hearing before 
the Board of County Commissioners and the trial is 
undisputed as to the habits of the traveling public on the 
Freeway. Such persons will simply not be inconven· 
ienced. Mr. Ralph Strong summed up the extensiw 
research that his company had made regarding the 
habits of the users of Freeways with these words: 
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"Now, Phillips has had a lot of experience in 
the interstate locations. \Ve were one of the first 
companies to recognize that our traveling cus-
tomer, the traveling public, will not be mcon-
venienced. They will not pull off the interstate 
system and go through these towns and buck these 
towns, to get service, and of course that's why 
the interstate system was recommended and ap-
proved and is being built. It's so the tourists, 
the motoring public will not be inconvenienced 
to make a nice straight shot at their destination. 
" ... we found our customer won't even pull off 
the interstate if there is more than one scnice 
station at an interchange, they will trade at the 
service station that is closer to the interchai1ge. 
They won't go another 100 yards or whatever 
au<l be inconvenienced that much, just a few 
seconds." ( H-28-29) 
:Jlr. Uon Major, an official of the Pacific Inter-
mountain Express trucking line, was called on behalf 
of the Plaintiffs at the hearing before the County Com-
missioners. He stated that trucks require a stop about 
every 100 miles, in order to refuel and as rest stops for 
their drivers, but they do not permit trucks to go into 
'mall towns for fuel and services, because of the delays 
encountered and the resulting high expense involved in 
payroll and tying up their equipment. He explained 
that trucking companies desire to keep their big trucks 
out of downtown areas, because of the traffic hazards 
a ncl sat' ety factors. ( H-58-9) . He also pointed out 
that all of the large truck lines have established fueling 
'itol1s, so that a trucker knows the location where he will 
buy fuel, before he leaves his terminal (H-61). He also 
13 
... 
stated that, in his opm10n, because of the strategica 
location of the Pine Creek Interchange, it could deyeJo
1 
into a natural truck stop (H-62). Mr. Major's testi. 
mony is unrefuted. 
There is no question but that there preseHtly exist.1 
a need for a highway service zone at Pine Creek luter 
change. This testimony was not refuted or contradicted. 
Mr. Kent D. Elwell, a partner in the firm of Economic 
and Planners Research Associates, of Salt Lake City, 
called to testify on behalf of the Plaintiffs, explaine1l 
the need of Pine Creek Interchange in these words: 
"Q. Have your s1udies of the Interchange 
State Svstem indicated how often or at what dis· 
tance h~ghway service facilities should be made 
available to the traveling public? 
"A. Highway service facilities, perhaps, ever) 
twenty-five to thirty miles is a general guide 
line that is published by the Bureau of Publir 
Roads. 
"Q. Do you have an opinion, Mr. Elwell, m 
to the need for highway services presently al 
the Pine Creek Interchange? 
"A. I do. 
"Q. "\Vill you state your opinion? 
"A. I think that the traffic volumes that haw 
already been cited, the fact that you have ap· 
proximately 8,000 persons t~aveling only one 
way, which could be in the ne1ghborhood of !6: 
000 people going both wa~s per day, .cert.a1~h 
indicates a need for some highway service facil 1• 
ties at the Pine Creek area. As a matter of fact. 
14 
that represents almost four times the number of 
residents in Beaver County, does it not?" (ll-
139) 
Dr. Milton Matthews, Professor at the School of 
Business of the University of Utah, who was called to 
le:,tify concerning the economic condition of Beaver 
County, also stated that his economic studies indicated 
a present need for highway service facilities at Pine 
Creek Interchange (D-36). 
C. THE EFFECT OF' THE PHESENT 
ZONING RESOLUTION IS TO REGU-
LA TE AND RESTRICT BUSINESS AND 
TO CREATE A MONOPOLY AT BEAVER 
CITY. 
That the County Planing Commission and the 
Board of County Commissioners were motivated by fi-
nancial interest and a desire to control and restrict com-
petition to the existing business in Beaver City is at 
once apparent. The zoning resolution was a deliberate 
attempt to force the freeway traveler to leave the free-
way and patronize the existing businesses in Beaver 
City. The actual effect of the zoning resolution is to 
control competition and prevent the establishment of 
businesses at better locations elsewhere in the county. 
Mr. I. Dale Despain (the Defendants' own wit-
ness) admitted, on cross-examination: 
"Q. Well, now, you have testified that, and 
it appears to be one of the theories that you have 
used, and correct me if I'm wrong, that by not 
15 
zoning highway service you can get the tran~ler.1 
to leave the Interstate Highway and come a 
quarter of a mile, half a mile, into the center ol 
Heaver City to buy their products and to recein 
the serYices they need as highway tnffelcrs, h 
that right? 
"A. I'm sure that if there were no other high. 
way facilities other than at Beaver that then 
would be more of the highway people come into 
Beaver to get their services than otherwise. 
"Q. And that's the reason it was zoned the way 
it was zoned, is that right? · 
"A. And that was one of the reasons. 
"Q. Hut you would admit' wouldn't you, that 
it would certainly be more in keeping with corn 
mercial development and more in keeping witl1 
convenience to the public to have a highway ser· 
vice area right immediately at an interchange~ 
"A. If we were concerucd only with the high· 
way service users, yes, highway users, not ser· 
vices. 
"Q. Now, you admitted that Pine Creek rep· 
resents prob~bily the ideal location for a high 
way service location if one were to be selected 11 1 
Beaver County, isn't that right, the Interchaugr 
at Pine Creek? 
"A. It is one of the logical locations. 
"MR. CHRISTIAXSEN: Object. Ht 
did not admit it was the ideal. He said I' 
was a logical -
"MR. BETTIL YON: I have no objcc 
tion to that wording." (R-391-2) 
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A few minutes later, Mr. Despain said: 
"Q. But if Beaver City were not here then 
it wouldn't make any difference if Pine' Creel~ 
were zoned, would it, were zoned highway ser-
vice? 
"A. Oh, I think if Beaver City and there were 
no other comparable communities along the hig.h-
way affected with it, that it would be logical." 
(R-393) 
Mr. Owen ~r. Burnham, testifying on behalf of the 
Plaintiffs, stated his opinion as to the effect of the }ka-
ver County Zoning Resolution, as follows: 
"Q. Now, specifically with regard to the zon-
ing resolution in Beaver County, you have read 
this resolution, I presume? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You're familiar with iU 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Now, what is the actual effect of a zoning 
resolution such as we have in Beaver County that 
restricts all business to the area close by the 
incorporated centers? 
"A. 'i\T ell, on the face of it, in answer to the 
question directly, I believe the effect, of 12ourse, 
is to force any business that's to be conducted 
to be conducted there and as such certainly tends, 
or directly causes a monopoly situation. 
"Q. What's fundamentally wrong with such a 
zoning concept? 
"A. 'i\T ell, I have never believed that the pur-
pose of zoning was to foster or promote or per-
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petuate monopolies as such. I don't believe that 
the. statute authori:ws a city or a county to use 
zonmg as a tool to perpetuate monopoly or tu 
institute it." (R-202-3) · 
The Defendant proffered no evidence indicating 
that the effect of the zoning resolution was anything 
but to regulate business within the County of Beam 
and to establish a monopoly at Beaver City, by predud· 
ing the development of any competitive enterprise at 
the Pine Creek Interchange or elsewhere. 
The zoning resolution was proposed in contempla· 
tion of the eventual construction of the freeway and 
after the decision was made, the resolution itself was 
hastily prepared. Mr. I. Dale Despain admitted ou 
cross-examination that it was copied from the zoning 
resolution of Iron County ( R-378-9). No comprehen-
sive zoning plan was ever undertaken. The Planning 
Commission does not hold regular meetings but meets 
only as items are presented to them for consideration. 
No effort has been made to study the changing condi-
tions and, in particular, the effect that the freeway has 
made or the effect that the freeway will have on Beaver 
County after its completion. 
It is clear from the evidence presented, that the 
resolution was conceived and has been used since its 
inception to aid existing businesses in Beaver City. Its 
purpose and effect is to preclude any competition with 
Beaver City and thereby create a monopoly, and this 
despite the .fact that Pine Creek Interchange is located 
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~o miles North of Beaver City and that there is clearly 
a present need for the construction of highway servic;; 
facilities at that point. 
D. THE ESTABLISHMENT O.F A HlGH-
\\'AY SERVICE ZONE AT PINE CREE1~ 
INTERCHANGE WILL INCREASE THE 
TAX BASE OF BEAVER COUNTY AND 
HAVE NO MEASURABLE DETlUMEN-
TAL EFFECT UPON THE COUNTY OR 
ANY OF THE INCORPORATED CITIES. 
The population of Beaver County has decline<l 
from 5,014 in the year 1940 to 4,200 in 1965. Dr . .Milton 
Matthews stated, in his testimony, that retail sales in 
Beaver County has increased 51 % from 1948 to 1953, 
but retail sales for the entire State of Utah for the same 
period have increased 110%. It is estimated that infla-
tion over the past 15 years has increased sales by ap-
proximately 40%, so that retail sales in Beaver County 
han remained almost stable while the rest of the state 
has increased approximately 50% above what would 
normally be attributed to inflation (D-48). Dr . .Mat-
thews also explained that 33% of the retail sales of Bea-
Yer County were heavily oriented to highway traffic 
and, as an illustration of this reliance upon the traveling 
public, he noted that Beaver County has the highest per 
capita of gas sales in all counties in the State of Utah, 
South of Utah County (D-19-20). 
It is not feasible nor is it to be expected that any 
new service stations, motels or chain restaurants, will be 
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constructed in Beaver City proper in the foreseeablt 
future ( D-25-26, 30-32). This follows from the COii· 
struction of I-15 and the eventual bypass of Bearer 
City and not from the possible construction of facilitie1 
in any other locality. This testimony was not refuted 
by the Defendants; yet, in the face of these realities, fa 
Beaver County Commission failed to do the very Uung 
that would bolster the failing economy and increase !ht 
tax base of Beaver County. 
In contrast to this, the unrefuted testimony wa, 
that the tax base of Beaver County would be substm:-
tially increased and strengthened by the constructio11 
of proposed facilities at Pine Creek Interchange (R 
218-9), (Exhibit 24). 
The County Planning Commission stated their rea-
sons for denying the application for zoning at Pine 
Creek Interchange, as follows: 
"The petitioners' lands approximately 20 mib 
North of Beaver City would require an addi 
tional cost to the County, providing additional 
police and fire protection and other governmen· 
tal services; that a commercial development at 
that location to serve the traveling public woulo 
seriously endanger the economic stability of the 
existing communities in the County, particular]) 
Beaver City since its economic stability is heaY11' 
dependent upon tourist business and the tax base 
within the existing communities would thereb) 
be endangered and that a commercial develop· 
ment at the location of the petitioners' lands~ 
not necessary since all of the services which i'. 1' 
anticipated would be provided at the new locat101 
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are pres~1!t1Y. available in or near the existing 
commumhes m the County and there is s1)ace iu 
or near the existing communities of the County 
for the construction of additional like facilities." 
(Exhibit 17, Minutes of the Planning Commis-
sion l\Ieeting held October H, 1965). 
Each of these contentions was refuted at the trial 
an<l no evidence was submitted by Defendants to sup-
port any of the delineated reasons for denying Plain-
tiffs' application for wning change. As a matter of 
fact, the zoning resolution will not accomplish any legiti-
mate objective whatsoever. See the testimony of Dr. 
::\Iilton Matthews (R-210-227). Accordingly, the com-
missioners stated reasons for denying the Plaintiffs' 
zoning applications were nothing more than feeble ex-
cuses to effect the illegal purpose of controlling and 
regulating business by means of the zoning ordinance. 
The evidence at the hearing before the County 
Commissioners and the evidence at the trial was m·cr-
whelmingly to the effect that any economic detriment 
that might come to Beaver County would be directly 
related to the construction of the freeway and the re-
sulting bypass of Beaver City. All of the evidence indi-
cated that Pine Creek Interchange, which is 20 miles 
North of Beaver City, was too remote to affect Beaver 
City. Many of the witnesses pointed out that one-half 
of the vehicles (north bound) had already passed Bea-
ver City and the construction at Pine Creek Interchange 
gave the County one more opportunity to gain "export 
1L dollars" for the traveling public. 
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The case of Naylor vs. Salt Lake City, 17 Ctah 
2d 300; 410 P2d 764<, cited in Chevron's Brief, sets forth 
the foundational reason for zoning but none of these 
reasons or objectives are met in the resolution in ques-
tion. It is clear that the zoning resolution is arbilrnrr. 
unreasonable, discriminatory an<l void, as applied tu the 
Plaintiffs' property. It represents a flagrant abuse of 
the police power. 
POINT Ill 
THE ZONING RESOLUTION ADOPTED 
BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIOK-
ERS ON MAY 18, 1959, IS ARBITRARY AXD 
CAPRICIOUS ON I'l'S FACE AND E\'J. 
DENCES ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE 
PART OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY CO}l-
MISSIONERS. 
The Court will observe that in Article I of the 
resolution, page 2, (Exhibit 1), the legislatively deter· 
mined purposes of the resolution are set forth with 
reference being made to "each of the zones" ostensibly 
made in accordance with a "comprehensive plan." Next 
it is observed that purpose No. 10 is "to protect both 
urban and non-urban development." In the declaration 
( 1-3) on page 2, reference is again made to "each of 
the zones" the "due and careful consideration" givm 
among other things, to "the 1mitability of the land for 
particular uses" and to "the character of the zone with 
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a view to conserving the value of buildings and encour-
aying the most appropriate nse of land thronghout the 
county." (Emphasis added.) 
On page 27 of the zoning resolution the county is 
hereby divided into zones" as set forth. Zone HS-1 
Highway Service Zone is specifically created. Thus, the 
necessity of a Highway Service Zone was legislatively 
determined. 
Additionally, "the location and boundaries of each 
of the zones" are stated in Paragraph 7-2 of Article 
YU to be "shown on the ZONE MAP OF BEA VER 
COUNTY, UTAH." The map is specifically made 
part of the resolution. 
Thus, all of the zones are legislatively established, 
with reference being made to each of them, which zones 
are shown on the ZONE MAP, all pursuant to the 
legislatively determined needs and purposes as set forth 
on page 2 of the resolution. 
Now turning to the Highway Service Zone on page 
43 of the resolution, we find set forth the legislatively 
determined, "General Objectives and Characteristics" 
of this zone. Included in the General Objectives and 
Characteristics of the Highway Service Zone is the 
following: 
"In general, the H-1 Zones are. located along 
Interstate Highways, several miles from any 
established communities where service facilities 
are required to meet the needs of the traveling 
public." 
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It is noted that the very <lescription of the ff 
Zone amounts to a legislative recognition that sucl 
zones and "service facilities are required to meet th 
needs of the traveling public.'' (Emphasis added.) 
The six objectives of the Highway Zone are spec. 
fically set forth among which is to "protect urban dt 
velopment." It is noted that the Highway Service Zan 
is the only zone having as one of its declared purpost 
the protection of urban development. 
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, the Hoar, 
of County Commissioners, contrary to the expre1· 
declaration of the resolution, contrary to the legislati11 
recognition that such zones and service facilities m1 
required to meet the needs of the traveling public, con 
trary to the express legislatively determined purpost 
of the ordinance and contrary to the legislative deter 
mination that highway service zones would protel' 
urban development, failed and refused to allocate an.: 
land whatsoever to that zone . 
The inconsistency of the zoning resolution is all 
the more amplified by the testimony of the Defendant· 
own witness, Dale Despain, who testified on cross ex 
amination with respect to the needs of the travelini 
public ( R-359-360). He also testified on cross-exa1111 
nation that the protection of "urban development" wa· 
a paramount objective of the ordinance (R. 365). It 
Dale Despain' s testimony as to this "paramount objec 
tive" of the ordinance be true (and it can't be true 
for if it were, land would have been allocated h 
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the Highway Service Zone), then it was even more 
flagrant for Beaver County to fail to allocate any 
land to the Highway Service Zone, since that zow' 
is the only zone having as one of its expressed pur-
poses the protection of urban development. 
It is at once apparent that the zoning resolution 
is a sham; that the Beaver County Commission con-
fused "regulation of business" with "protection of urban 
development" and, that motivated by the former, it 
passed the ordinance for that specific, but unlawful 
purpose-to preclude the development of any business 
at the Pine Creek Interchange that would be competi-
tiYe with the desired monopoly in Beaver City. 
If Beaver County were bona fide in its desire to 
provide highway service zones and service facilities "to 
meet the needs of the traveling public" it would cer-
tainly have allocated the ideal spot in Beaver County 
for that purpose rather than refusing to make any allo-
cation at all. 
If Beaver County really wanted to protect "urban 
development" and thereby accomplish a declared pur-
pose of the ordinance, it would have proceeded to 
allocate land to the Highway Service Zone, as it had 
already legislaitvely determined to be proper by the 
creation of that zone for the purposes indicated. Indeed, 
the only way this purpose could have been accomplished 
was by the creation of a Highway Service Zone. This 
was e~plained by Owen Burnham, when he stated: 
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"\Vell, as I stated, I believe that with the In-
terstate Highway, you are dealing with a new 
factor, a new problem which is different than 
other highways and is different than the proL-
lem of existing urban <levelupment as such. I 
believe that you have here the users of this facili-
ty which are going through or possibly going to 
stop in the county. Probably a majority of them 
will be going through and if you do not allow 
the establishment of service facilities, the count\' 
will lose forever the potential revenue which the)· 
could gain from this through direct and indirect 
taxes, and as a result of this, to raise their neces· 
sary revenues they will then have to tax the resi-
dents, the property, and the residents of the 
county to raise this lost revenue." (R-217-218.) 
Accordingly, by failing to create a Highway Service 
Zone, Beaver County is, in effect, actually frustrating 
urban development, an<l the ordinance, on its face, is 
contradictory, and defeats the accomplishment of the 
express, legislatively determined, purposes for which 
it was adopted. 
Furthermore, it is noted that in purpose No. 1 of 
the resolution as set forth on page 20 thereof, that the 
said resolution is limited in scope to the "inhabitants 
of Beaver County," whereas Section 17 -27-13, Vtah 
Code Annotated, 1953, provides tlw following: 
"Such regulations shall be designed and en-
acted for the purpose of promoting the health, 
safety, morals, conyenience, order, prosperity or 
welfare of the present and future inhabitants of 
the State of Utah ... " 
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Thus the ordinance on its face is limited in scope 
io the inhabitants of Beaver County in the face of 
enabling legislation permitting the adoption of the 
zoning resolution, which enabling legislation requires 
that the "present and future inhabitants of the State 
of l! tah" be considered. The ordinance accordingly 
fails ,on its face, to meet an essential statutory require-
ment. 
The evil that results from the failure of the ordi-
nance to meet the indicated statutory requirement is 
of considerable consequence in the face of the reality 
that the average daily flow of traffic along I-15, on 
the completed leg of the Freeway between Beaver City 
and the Pine Creek Interchange, is 2,685 vehicles, 
representing approximately 7,500 persons using the 
freeway each day. This is nearly twice the population 
of Beaver County. As a matter of fact, it is estimated 
by studies conducted by the State Road Commissi011 
that the average daily traffic in 1975 will be 5,800 
vehicles, or an average of 1,500 persons using the Free-
way each day. (Exhibit 20), (R-120-121). 
POINT NO. IV 
THE ZONING RESOLUTION AS ADOPT-
ED BY BEA VER COUNTY HAS THE EF-
FECT OF INTERFERING lVITH AND BE-
ING A BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE. 
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The testimony bearing on this point is undisputed. 
At the time of the trial, there were some 2,685 vehicles 
per day passing through Pine Creek Interchange. 
(Exhibit 20.) 
This volume of traffic is expected to increase to 
5,800 vehicles by 1975, or an average of 15,000 persons 
per day. (Exhibit 20). Much of the traffic is interstate 
traffic. 
The evidence is undisputed that the traveling 
public insists on staying on the Freeway, and is reluctant 
to depart therefrom. See the testimony of Ralph Strong 
(H-28-31); the testimony of \\Tilliam McKenzie (R 
39-40); the testimony of Kent Elwell ( R-123) ; the 
testimony of Dr. Milton Matthews ( B-23 et seq.); and 
even the testimony of the Defendant's witness, Dale 
Despain (R-123-124-359-360). As a matter of fact. 
Dale Despain conceded that the traveling public would 
consider itself burdened to be forced to leave the free-
way to obtain the benefit of highway service facilities 
(R-123-124). 
"\iVhile the zoning resolution does not directly im· 
pede the interstate movement of traffic on l-15 through 
Beaver County, the evil of the ordinance is at once 
apparent insofar as this traffic is concerned. Beaver 
County, determined to regulate business and preclude 
the development of highway oriented facilities along 
the interstate, deliberately zoned the whole of the county 
with no land being allocated whatsoever for highway 
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service zones, all in a determined effort to force traffic 
from the Freeway into Beaver City to secure those 
services normally expected and anticipated in the 
proximity of the Freeway itself. The zoning ordinance, 
therefore, interferes with interstate traffic and casts 
an undue burden on those who travel the freeway. The 
traveling public, of course, must have the benefit of 
highway oriented facilities and services. The need of 
gasoline products, food and personal services is obvious. 
Such highway oriented facilities are more normally 
<leveloped with the highway system, and would be ex-
pected to develop along or near the arterial freeways 
of this nation as they come into existence. If all of the 
counties in this western part of the United States 
through which the freeways run were to follow the 
example of Beaver County, it is at once apparent that 
an interstate traveler would be denied the very benefit 
the freeways were intended to afford. Instead of being 
able to acquire, in the proximity of the Freeway, goods 
and services which he must have as he travels, the 
traveler would be required to interrupt his journey, 
depart from the freeway, and go into the small com-
munities to obtain needed services, all because of a 
determined effort to require the patronization of vested 
business interests in these communities. 
Accordingly, the actual effect of the action of 
Beaver County in adopting the zoning resolution is 
to interfere with and burden Interstate Commerce. If 
this court were to uphold the resolution and declare 
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the same to be valid, such would be an invitation to 
every county in the State of Utah, and beyond, to follow 
suit. 
Our research discloses no zoning case directly in point, 
but this is not surprising in view of the recency of the 
development of our arterial freeway system throughout 
the \Vest. The applicable law and guidelines in analo-
guous situations are, however, well established. The 
regulation of interstate commerce is within the provime 
of Congress, and no state, county, or municipality ca11 
unreasonably interfere with or burden the same. Inter-
state Buses Corp. vs. Holyoke Street R. Co., 47 S. Ct. 
298, 273, U. S. 45, 71 L. ed. 530 (1926); Southerland 
vs. St. Croix Taxicab Association,, 315 F. 2d 364 (3rd 
Cir. 1963). See also the following annotations: 36 ALR 
lllO, s. 38 ALR 291, 47 ALR 230, 49 ALR 1203, 
62 ALR 52, 85 ALR 1136, 109 ALR 1245, 135 ALR 
1358; 86 ALR 281; 121 ALR 568, 75 L. ed 954, s. 
92 L. ed 109, and 97 L. ed 573; 97 L. ed 176, s. 2 L. ea 
2d 2090. Also see 15 C.J.S. Commerce, Sec. 71 (I! 
p. 639; and also 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and High· 
way Traffic, Sec. 21, P. 613, and 15 Am. Jur. 2d 
Commerce, Sec. 18, p. 648, Sec. 17, p. 647, Sec. 69, 
p. 714-716, and Sec. 79, p. 723. 
There is no single concept of interstate commerc< 
which can be applied to every issue. McLeod vs. Threl· 
keld, 319 U.S. 491, 495, 63 S. Ct. 1348, 87 L. ed. 1538. 
1542 (1943); Southerland vs. St. Croix Taxicab As· 
sociation, 315 F. 2d 364 (3rd Cir. 1963). 
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Each case must be viewed on its own peculiar 
facts. Southerland vs. St. Croix Taxicab Association, 
315 F. 2d 364 (3rd Cir. 1963). 
The reasonableness of the county's action insofar 
as it affects interstate commerce is certainly an appro-
priate subject of inquiry. Hendrick vs. Maryla;id, 
23V U.S. 610, 35 S. Ct. 140, 59 L. ed. 385 ( 1914). 
SUMMARY 
The zoning resolution of Beaver County, as ap-
plied to Plaintiffs' property, contiscates it and violates 
rights guaranteed by both the State and .Federal Con-
stitutions. In addition the zoning ordinance is arbi-
trary, unreasonable, discriminatory, and void as applied 
to the plaintiffs' property. The Pine Creek Interchange 
is the best location along I-15 in Beaver County for 
the establishment of a highway service zone. The failure 
to allow the development of a highway oriented facility 
at this interchange thwarts the development of Beaver 
County and is nothing more than an overt attempt to 
regulate and restrict business and to create a monopoly 
at the City of Beaver. Furthermore, the zoning reso-
lution adopted by the Board of County Commissioners 
is, on its face, arbitrary and capricious, and evidences 
an abuse of discretion on the part of the Board of 
County Commissioners. Furthermore, the zoning reso-
lution has the added effect of interfering with and being 
a burden on interstate commerce. 
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Accordingly, this court should reverse the judg-
ment of the trial court, and remand the case with direc-
tions to make and enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment consistent with the foregoing 
and as prayed for in the Plaintiffs' complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BETTIL YON & HOW ARD 
By: Verden E. Bettilyon 
McKAY AND BURTON 
By: Macoy A. McMurray 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
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